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Abstract
This Article argues that pirates should be treated as terrorists and that piracy-fighting countries should rely on a variety of antiterrorist conventions to justify the capture and prosecution of
pirates. To provide a comprehensive outlook on piracy, Part I of this Article describes the history of piracy and its reappearance in the modern world. Part II briefly describes the resurgence
of modern-day piracy, first in Southeast Asia and then in Somalia. Part III provides the current
international legal framework for battling piracy, by focusing first on the definition of piracy in
international law, and then on the existing international legal authority to apprehend and prosecute
pirates. Part IV describes the existing options and solutions for fighting pirates, including domestic prosecutions, prosecutions in ad hoc tribuals, regional partnerships, and the aid of international
maritime organizations. Part V advocates the need to fight piracy more aggressively, explaining
the similarity between pirates and terorists. Finally, Part V also advocates the need to rebuild Somalia and its institutions, as this is the only permanent solution to eradicate piracy in this region
of the world.

FIGHTING PIRACY IN SOMALIA (AND
ELSEWHERE): WHY MORE IS NEEDED
Milena Sterio*
INTRODUCTION
The Somali pirates are dangerous. They are sea terrorists,
operating on a supranational level-beyond the reach of any
laws, in the name of no particular state, and against no specific
nations.1 They enjoy complete impunity; most of the time, they
2
are simply chased off, and if captured, they are often released. It
would be unimaginable for the United States to capture an AlQaeda operative or a member of any other terrorist group in
order to then promptly release him or her, not wanting to bother
with the cost and difficulty of a criminal prosecution. Yet, this is
precisely what some countries, like United Kingdom and France,
have done with respect to captured pirates-they have let them
go. 3 Other nations and maritime powers have, wrongly, not said a
word about it. The global laissez-faire attitude toward the Somali
pirates needs to change, and the passivity of the United States
and other naval nations toward these sea terrorists must come to
an end.
World powers, like the United States, should be willing to
take on the Somali pirates for several reasons. First, the legal
tools needed to capture and prosecute these pirates are already
in place. The United Nations Security Council has facilitated the
fight against Somali piracy by passing five different resolutions
during 2008. 4 These resolutions authorize nations patrolling
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law
School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Universit6 Paris IPantheon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master's degree), Private International
Law, UniversitE Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., Rutgers University,
French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 1998. The author thanks
Ekaterina Zabalueva for her invaluable assistance with the research and writing of this
article.
1. See discussion infra Part V.A.
2. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
3. See discussion infra Part V.A.
4. See infraPart III.B.
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waters in the Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, to cross into the
twelve nautical mile zone of Somali territorial waters if selfdefending or pursuing pirates. 5 Moreover, a combination of two
different international conventions regulating the law of the seas
arguably provides jurisdiction to try pirates to either the
capturing nation or to any nation where the pirates have been
rendered for prosecution. 6 The United Kingdom, for instance,
has even signed a memorandum of understanding with its
regional partner Kenya whereby Kenya would try any pirates
captured by the United Kingdom. 7 Thus, world powers like the
United Kingdom and the United States may apprehend and try
Somali pirates under existing law. It is time that they actually do
SO.
Second, pirates are sea terrorists and may be or become
linked to other terrorist groups. 8 For now, we do not know
whether the proceeds of piracy are financing other forms of
terrorism. However, it is reasonably likely that the Somali pirates
will be befriended by groups like the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, for
whom pirates can easily steal money and weapons. Furthermore,
the Somali pirates, if linked to a terrorist group, may attempt to
use the hostages that they are already holding 9 as political
leverage against a host of unreasonable and politically dangerous
demands. This type of hostage use is not novel. Some may
remember the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in
1985 by a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The
hijackers refused to release the kidnapped hostages unless Israel
released a group of Palestinian prisoners.10 The United States has
been lucky until recently-only one U.S. ship was successfully
hijacked by the Somali pirates and, after a three day long stand-

5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. See Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia, ASIL INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
8. U.S. officials believe that there are Al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia. See Todd
Pitman, Ending Somali Piracy: Few Options for US Forces, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 14,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8455767.
9. By the end of 2009, suspected Somali pirates held 12 vessels for ransom with 263
crewmembers of various nationalities as hostages. See Louis Charbonneau, EU Welcomes
29,
2010,
China's Support Against Somalia Piracy, INSURANCE J., Jan.
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/intemational/2010/01/29/ 106976.htm.
10. See infra Part III.A.
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off in the Indian Ocean, all U.S. hostages were safely rescued."
In the future, the United States may not remain as fortunate. The
Somali pirates have already pledged that they would go after
more U.S. ships and, in the recent months, have certainly done
so, albeit with no success. 12 Thus, the threat of piracy linked to
traditional forms of terrorism looms large for countries, like the
United States, that may become particular targets.
Finally, not fighting Somali piracy signals a careless passivity
to potentially dangerous individuals and groups across the globe
looking to engage in similar types of criminal behavior. If the
United States, the United Kingdom, or France is not willing to
fight pirates in Somalia, then the Nigerian or Indonesian pirates
may become just as brash in their efforts to seize ships, steal
money, and capture hostages. Then, piracy would become a
global issue, as it once was in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. 13 This is a dangerous proposal that should be cut at its
roots.
This Article argues that pirates should be treated as
terrorists and that piracy-fighting countries should rely on a
variety of antiterrorist conventions to justify the capture and
prosecution of pirates. Piracy resembles terrorism in many
aspects, on both a theoretical and practical level, and reliance on
antiterrorist conventions by piracy-fighting countries will provide
these countries with greater legal tools to battle pirates within an
established international legal framework. To provide a
comprehensive outlook on piracy, Part I of this Article describes
the history of piracy and its reappearance in the modern world.
Part II briefly describes the resurgence of modern-day piracy, first
in Southeast Asia and then in Somalia. Part III provides the
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kennedy & Katharine Houreld, Norfolk-Based Ship Arrives
in Kenya; Negotiationsfor CaptainBreak Down, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Apr. 12, 2009,
at Al; Robin Shulman, Somali Charged with Piracy in Attack on U.S. Ship, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 2009, at A2; PiratesAttack U.S. Cargo Ship But Fail to Get Aboard, CNN, Apr. 14, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/14/somalia.pirates/.
12. Somali pirates vowed to go after more U.S. ships after several pirates were killed
during the successful rescue by the United States of a U.S. captain held hostage. See
Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Pirates Target, Vow to Kill US Crews, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2009,
at A14. Several days later, they attempted to hijack a U.S. ship, the Liberty Sun, but were
unsuccessful. See Robert Wright, PiratesDamage US Aid Ship, FINANCIAL TIMES (London),
Apr. 16, 2009, at 2; see also New PirateAttack Thwarted in Gulf of Aden, CNN, Apr. 19, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/19/pirate.attack.foiled/.
13. See discussion infra Part I.
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current international legal framework for battling piracy, by
focusing first on the definition of piracy in international law, and
then on the existing international legal authority to apprehend
and prosecute pirates. Part IV describes the existing options and
solutions for fighting pirates, including domestic prosecutions,
prosecutions in ad hoc tribunals, regional partnerships, and the
aid of international maritime organizations. Part V advocates the
need to fight piracy more aggressively, explaining the similarity
between pirates and terrorists, and argues that pirates should be
apprehended and prosecuted like terrorists. Finally, Part V also
advocates for the need to rebuild Somalia and its institutions, as
this is the only permanent solution to eradicate piracy in this
region of the world. Before concluding, this Article briefly
addresses a potential criticism: that the fight against piracy may
be entirely illusory because maritime powers may not have any
true incentive to combat pirates, for a variety of financial,
geopolitical, or strategic reasons. This Article recognizes such
criticism, but advances the argument that pirates (at least
theoretically or normatively) need to be fought with full force.
Thus, this Article concludes that serious efforts by piracy-fighting
countries will be needed to resolve the piracy issue, and that,
above all, piracy-fighting countries may need to focus on
rebuilding war-torn regions to prevent lawlessness, including
piracy, from thriving in other parts of the world.
I.

PIRACY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Piracy has always existed. First descriptions of the practice
exist in Homer's The Ilia 1 4 and The Odyssey,'5 and piracy was
considered a reputable profession in Greek mythology. 6 In the
first century B.C., piracy was viewed as a legitimate practice in the
Mediterranean because pirates supplied the Roman empire with

14. See HOMER, THE ILIAD 189-90 (Prentiss Cummings trans., Little, Brown, and
Co. 1912) (750-725 B.C.) (recounting Achilles' plunder of twelve cities during naval
campaigns).
15. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 126 (Louise Ropes Loomis ed., Samuel Butler trans.,
WalterJ. Black, Inc. 1944) (800 B.C.) (analogizing to the practices of pirates).
16. See, e.g., VIVIAN LOUIS FORBES, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN MANAGING
MARITIME SPACE IN SEMI-ENCLOSED SEA 102 (2001); George P. Smith, II, From Cutlass to

Cat-O'Nine Tails: The Casefor InternationalJurisdictionof Mutiny on the High Seas, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 277, 291 n.140 (1989).
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slaves for its luxury markets. 17 It was not until pirates began
disrupting vital trade routes to the East and to Africa that cities
began to form alliances against pirates. 18 The Roman empire
embraced the fights against piracy, and in 67 B.C., a Roman
commander, Pompey, was finally ordered to rid the
Mediterranean of pirates. 19 Because of the Roman fight against
piracy, the definition of piracy can be traced back to the Roman
republic: Cicero dubbed pirates "hostis humani generi,"20 and
contemporaneous laws drafted by Cicero and the Roman Senate
construed piracy as both action against individuals and against
the nation as a whole. 2 1 Under Roman law, all crimes constituting
piracy had to occur outside the municipal jurisdiction of any
nation; the pirate was viewed as an enemy of the entire human
race and could be prosecuted under municipal law after capture,
but the right to prosecute was common to all nations. 22 These
early laws still form the foundation of international criminal law
on piracy, and introduce the notion of universal jurisdiction over
piracy. 23 In fact, piracy is the first and foremost universal
24
jurisdiction crime.
While piracy was viewed as a universal crime during the
Roman era, the view on pirates changed later in time, and piracy
reached its so-called golden age during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. 25 In the sixteenth century, the English
Queen Elizabeth actually viewed pirates as adjuncts to the
Crown's navy in its fight against Spanish trade. 26 Piracy thus
became a form of state-sponsored terrorism, and pirates
themselves were considered "an ideal way to strike one's enemy
and hide the blade."2 7 During the Elizabethan era, piracy was like
17. SeeJon D. Peppetti, Building the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational
Legal Structure to Combat TransnationalThreats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 87 (2008).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. The phrase "hostis humani generi" translates from Latin as "enemies of the
human race." See, e.g., Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi:Piracy, Terrorism and
a New InternationalLaw, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 293, 298 (2006).
21. See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 2, 18, 61 (2d ed. 1998).
22. See BARRY DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 42 (1980).
23. See RUBIN, supra note 21, at 117-18.
24. Kontorovich, supra note 7.
25. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 302-06 (describing the golden age of piracy).
26. See MJ. PETERSON, An HistoricalPerspective on the Incidence of Piracy, in PIRACY AT
SEA 41, 52 (Eric Ellen ed., 1989).
27. Burgess, supra note 20, at 302-03.
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modern-day terrorism: it contemplated the use of terror and
28
force for a particular political end.
With the end of the Spanish wars in the seventeenth
century, the laws against pirates briefly returned. 29 King James I
undertook efforts to fight piracy, but his efforts yielded poor
results as many pirates returned to their trade and as
impoverished men turned to the practice of piracy. 30 In fact,
historians believe that men turned to piracy not only for
monetary gain, but also because of "feelings of inferiority,
rebelliousness against their low station in life, anarchical hatred,
jealousy, [and] revenge.... Cast out from the fold, these men
regarded piracy as a means of exacting personal vengeance on
civilization itself." 31 Most pirates came from the lowest spheres of
society, and seemed to be motivated by both monetary and
political aims. - 2 Pirates during the golden age saw themselves as
rebels against the established societal order, "meting out
ferocious revenge on a society that had wronged them from
33
birth."
Some pirate captains acted like modern-day terrorists: they
had a reputation for barbarism and ferocity, adopted a satanic
appearance, and ruled as despots through terror. 34 Pirates in this
era, however, did not operate in a state of anarchy; rather, they
adopted codes of conduct known as "pirate articles," to organize
and structure pirate ships like a naval unit.35 Thus, pirates were
28. See RUBIN, supra note 21, at 59.
29. See David J. Starkey, Piratesand Markets, in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATES READER
107, 111 (C.R. Pennell ed., 2001).
30. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 303.
31. Id. at 304.
32. See id. at 306.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 304.
35. See id. at 305-06. An excerpt from the self-governing pirate articles of Captain
John Phillips in 1723 provides:
1. Every man shall obey civil Command; the Captain shall have one full
Share and a half in all prizes; the Master, Carpenter, Boatswain, and Gunner
shall have one Share and a quarter.
2. If any Man shall offer to run away, or keep any Secret from the
Company, he shall be maroon [eld with one Bottle of Powder, one Bottle of
Water, one small Arm, and Shot.
4. If at any Time we shall meet another Marooner (that is, Pyrate) that
Man shall sign his Articles without the Consent of our Company, shall suffer
such Punishment as the Captain and Company shall think fit.
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similar to terrorists in that they had their own organizational
rules and punishments for disobedience, which all existed on a
supranational level. In essence, "the pirate ship becomes a quasistate unto itself, a legal anomaly which customary international
law recognized by granting universal jurisdiction on its
36
capture."
Toward the late seventeenth century, with the end of many
wars between the powerful naval nations (England, France, and
Spain, among others), piracy suddenly stopped being used a
state-sponsored weapon and pirates, instead of acting on behalf
of certain states, turned against them. 37 In response to this shift
in piracy activities, laws of the naval nations changed and began
to target pirates. In 1696, Sir Charles Hedges in England defined
piracy as "sea-robbery," 38 and in 1700, England passed the Piracy
Act, 39 replacing jury trials of pirates with special commissions
applying both civil and admiralty law. 40 Thus, a fundamental shift
occurred in the law from the laissez-faire attitude toward piracy
of the Elizabethan era, to a view of piracy as a crime of universal
jurisdiction in the early eighteenth century, just like in the
Roman era. 41 In 1721, England passed an even more stringent
43
Piracy Act, 42 bringing an end to the piracy golden age.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, piracy did not
disappear.

9. If at any time you meet with a prudent Woman, that Man that offers to
meddle with her, without her Consent, shall suffer present Death.
DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 342-43 (Manuel Schonhorn ed.,

J.M. Dent & Sons 1999) (1724).
36. Burgess, supra note 20, at 306.
37. See id. at 307 (citing PIRATES AND PRIVATEERS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE WAR
ON TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 119 (David J. Starkey et al.

eds., 1997)); see also Starkey, supra note 29, at 118.
38. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 310 (quoting C.M. SENIOR, A NATION OF PIRATES:
ENGLISH PIRACY IN ITS HEYDAY 38 (1976)).

39. SeeAct for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 1700, 11 & 12 Will. 3, c.7,
reprinted in SIR WILLIAM DAVID EVANS, 6 A COLLECTION OF STATUTES CONNECTED WITH
THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW; ARRANGED ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF

SUBJECTS: WITH NOTES 126 (3d ed. 1836); see also RUBIN, supra note 21, at 400.
40. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 311 (citing P. Bradley Nutting, The Madagascar
Connection:Parliamentand Piracy, 1690-1701, 22 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 202, 209 (1978)).
41. See id. at 312.
42. See An Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of Piracy, 1721, 8 Geo. 1, c. 24,
reprintedin EVANS, supra note 39, at 131.
43. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 312; see also Starkey, supra note 29, at 121.
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The pirates of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were
no longer the flotsam of Europe's mercantile labor force, but
tightly-woven bands of Eastern corsairs, succeeding
generations of piratical clans sharing familial, tribal, ethnic,
religious, or political identities. Their continued survival was
assured by the Great Powers themselves, as Britain and
France actively encouraged the corsairs to disrupt the other's
4

trade.4

Although piracy was state-sponsored as it was in the
Elizabethan era, piracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries developed a different characteristic. Piracy became an
act of savagery: if committed by English or French nationals
belonging to civilized nations, it was viewed as treason, but if
committed by "savages," it was both permissible and politically
useful. 45 "By terming piracy an act of barbarity, the law was thus
able to meld the competing doctrines of political utility and hostis
humani generi."46 This view of piracy led to a paradoxical

situation, because the more the great powers employed pirates
against each other, the more their laws drove the definition of
piracy toward hostis humani generi.47 Finally, great powers arrived

at the modern-day definition of piracy as a crime so heinous
toward humanity in general, that pirates can be defined as
48
enemies of humanity on the whole.
For example, the emerging U.S. Navy scored a victory
against the Barbary pirates in 1804, signaling that pirates would
be viewed as an international threat. 49 In 1856, the Declaration of
Paris, 50 signed by almost all imperial powers, abolished all forms
of piracy, and pirates became subject to capture and trial where
they were apprehended. 51 Thus, states themselves recognized in
44. Burgess, supra note 20, at 313 (citing PETER EARLE, CORSAIRS OF MALTA AND
BARBARY 23, 42, 265-66 (1970)).
45. See id.; see also RUBIN, supra note 21, at 93-94.
46. Burgess, supranote 20, at 313.
47. See id. (citing EARLE, supra note 44, at 267).
48. Seeid. at 313-15.
49. See id. at 314 (citing Philip Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Toward a
Revised Definition of Maritime Piracy,8 CURRENTS: INTL'L TRADE L.J. 61, 64 (1999)).
50. See Declaration of Paris Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol.
T.S. 1, reprinted in 1 AMJ. INT'L L. 89 (Supp. 1907).
51. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 314 (citing Anne Phrotin-Dumon, The Pirate and
the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450-1850, in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATE
READER, supra note 29, at 45; P. W. Birnie, Piracy Past, Present and Future, in PIRACY AT
SEA, supra note 26, at 132).
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1856 their own shared guilt in supporting and enabling piracy
during the previous centuries. 52 The situation is somewhat
analogous to the modern-day combat against terrorism: many
states today have been blamed for training and supporting
terrorist groups for their own political aims, 53 and many such
states have now vowed to fight terrorism. 54 The Declaration of
Paris and subsequent legislation created a separate legal entity
for pirates, viewed neither as individuals nor states. 55 Rather,
piracy was defined as a political tool beyond the scope of
legitimate state behavior, and pirates themselves were not
entitled to any form of citizenship protection. A pirate became
defined as "a malevolent satellite to the law of nations, waging
war upon them not only through his acts, but through his
identity." 56 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the
abolition of piracy was solidified when even more nations,
including the United States, repudiated it as parties to the Hague
57
Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
Several points thus emerge from the historical perspective of
piracy described above, linking piracy to modern-day terrorism
(and justifying this Article's argument, below, that pirates today
should be fought just like terrorists). First, piracy, like terrorism,
embraces the use of terror by nonstate actors as a means of
coercing of states and their citizens. 58 Second, piracy has
historically been much more than sea robbery. Piracy should be
understood as a political tool for governments, private
individuals, or groups whose actions are directed toward a
52. See id. at 314-15 (citing P6rotin-Dumon, supra note 51, at 45).
53. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 314.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 315.
56. Id.
57. Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1 Bevans 263;
Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, 1 Bevans 694. The Hague Conventions do not
explicitly mention pirates, but they permit the capturing state to charge individuals, if
they are not acting pursuant to state orders or schemes, under their domestic criminal
law. Thus, states can charge individuals with piracy if the crime of piracy can be found in
municipal law. See RUBIN, supra note 21, at 199, nn.255, 294; see also Peppetti, supra note
17, at 88 n.86.
58. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 315; see also Marcus Rediker, The Seaman as Pirate:
Plunder and Social Banditry at Sea, in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATE READER, supra note 29, at
155.
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particular political goal of the sponsoring state. Acts of piracy,
viewed in this light, closely resemble terrorist acts. 59 Third, pirate
motivation throughout history closely resembles contemporary
terrorist motivation. Pirates waged a war against the world, which
they viewed as unjust, and terrorists today similarly aim their acts
against particular nations, in a war of nonstate actors versus
states. 60 Finally, the legal definitions of piracy and terrorism have
evolved to resemble each other. 61 Piracy today is seen less as sea
robbery and more as maritime terrorism, 62 as discussed below
and as reflected in modern-day treaties. 63 "As the world has
moved beyond the Cold War into a new century and new political
realities, so too will piracy law adopt these realities within a new,
64
unabashedly political, definition."
II. MODERN-DAY PIRACY
As described above, piracy was a hugely significant issue
throughout the Middle Ages. In the twentieth century, however,
the practice virtually disappeared before resurfacing again in the
late twentieth century, first in Southeast Asia and later in
Somalia.
A.

Southeast Asia

In the mid-1990s, piracy reemerged as a potent maritime
problem, affecting all nations, and thriving in specific waters and
sea passages. 65 In fact, driven by financial gains, modern-day
pirates seem to target particular straits where many ships pass
because of geography, such as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal,
66
and the Strait of Malacca.
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Strait of
Malacca in Southeast Asia saw an increase in pirate attacks, most
likely because thirty percent of the world's annual commerce and
fifty percent of the world's oil pass through this narrow body of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Burgess, supra note 20, at 315-16.
See id. at 316.
See id.
See id. at 318 & n.129.
See infra Part III.
See Burgess, supranote 20, at 321.
See, e.g., Peppetti, supra note 17, at 88.
See id.
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water. 67 For example, in 1996, armed pirates hijacked the
Malaysian oil tanker Suci in Indonesian waters, capturing the
68
ship's crew and later repainted the ship and changed its name.
The crew members were ultimately released by the pirates, but
the Suci has never been found. 69 In 1999, a Japanese tanker,
Alondra Rainbow, was attacked while sailing out of an Indonesian
port.70 The crew was dumped onto a lifeboat and the pirates
retained the ship and its cargo. 71 The International Maritime
Bureau ("IMB"), a branch of the International Chamber of
Commerce specializing in maritime affairs, reported 335 pirate
attacks in 2001, 370 in 2002, 445 in 2003, and 325 in 2004.72
While these numbers represent attacks throughout the world,
many of them occurred off the coast of Southeast Asia. 73 In fact,
Indonesian waters were considered the world's most dangerous
74
in 2006, with fifty pirate attacks.
Throughout the last decade, however, the Southeast Asian
nations, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore,
undertook significant effort to combat and reduce piracy off
their shores. 75 Their efforts yielded solid results, as piracy seems
to have drastically subsided in that area. Piracy, however, surged
in the most recent years off the coast of Somalia.
B.

Somalia

Somalia is poor and war-torn. It has not had a stable
government since 1991.76 It is thus fertile ground for various

67. See id. at 82.
68. See Helen Gibson, A Plague of Pirates: Modern Buccaneers with Machine Guns
Instead of Cutlasses Are Once Again the Scourge of the Oceans, TIME, Aug. 18, 1997, at 28.
69. See Andre Bolt, US Warships Seek Pirate-Hit Tanker, COURIER MAIL (Queensl.),
Apr. 28, 1998, at 3; Philippe B. Moulier & Ethan Casey, Pirates? What Pirates?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP.,June 23, 1997, at 33.
70. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 108.
71. See id. The Alondra Rainbow and the pirates that had hijacked the ship were
ultimately captured by the Indian navy. See id. at 109.
72. See Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves, Robbers, & Terrorists: Piracy in the 21st Century, 4
REGENTJ. INT'L L. 17, 17-18 (2006).

73. See id. at 18.
74. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 83.
75. J. Ashley Roach, Piracy Off Somalia: the Challenges for International Law,
Panel Discussion at the 103d Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter ASIL Meeting].
76. Kontorovich, supranote 7.
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forms of criminal activity, such as piracy.77 Starting in 2007, pirate
attacks intensified off the coast of Somalia, particularly in the
Gulf of Aden, a strait between northern Somalia-the Horn of
Africa-and the Arabian Peninsula. 78 In 2008 alone, piracy
attacks increased by two hundred percent, 79 and the first few
months of 2009 saw dozens of piracy attacks not only in the Gulf
of Aden, but also farther out in the Indian Ocean.80 Because
naval forces from piracy-fighting countries, including the United
States, heavily patrol the Gulf of Aden, the pirates moved their
operations farther south to the Indian Ocean.8 1 The Somali
pirates are currently holding close to three hundred hostages or
82
crewmembers from over a dozen ships.
The modus operandi seems simple: the Somali pirates sail
out of Somali ports, equipped with potent weapons and fast
ships, attack ships by firing at them, and then board them to
overtake their crew members.8 3 Recently, pirates have also begun
to capture larger vessels, which they use as "mother ships" to
launch their tiny skiffs throughout hundreds of miles in the
Indian Ocean.8 4 Most cargo ship crews are not equipped with
defensive weapons and not trained to fight pirates.8 5 In fact,
shipping companies themselves instruct their personnel not to
risk lives by engaging in fights with pirates.8 6 After ships are
seized, the Somali pirates retreat back to Somali ports and coastal
towns, where they enjoy complete impunity.8 7 Somalia does not
have a stable central government that can adequately apprehend

77. See, e.g., Jane G. Dalton et al., Introductory Note to United Nations Security Council:
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea-Resolutions 1816, 1846 & 1851, 48 I.L.M. 129, 129
(2009) ("Fueled by the violent political and economic instability in Somalia, the lack of
a viable infrastructure to counter lawlessness, and the continued proliferation of evermore-sophisticated small arms and light weapons ...piracy and armed robbery have
increasingly endangered legitimate shipping in the waters off the coast of Somalia.").
78. Kontorovich, supranote 7.
79. See id.
80. Int'l Mar. Bureau [IMB], Int'l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships: Reportfor the Period1 January-31March 2009, at 29 (Apr. 2009).
81. See Katharine Houreld, U.S.-Flagged Cargo Ship Has Run-in With Somali Pirates,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 9, 2009, at Al.
82. See Pitman, supranote 8.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
86. Id.
87. Id. (noting that hijacked ships are moored along the Somali coast).
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pirates.8 8 In fact, entire coastal towns in Somalia live off the
proceeds of piracy. 89 Pirates seem to drive the local economy and
thus enjoy societal protection everywhere within their country.
Poverty is rampant in Somalia, 90 and statistics show that a single
seizure of a ship can earn each pirate up to US$150,000.91 Thus,
pirates are driven by the financial promise of large sums of quick
money with low risk of ever being caught. Shipping companies
routinely pay millions of dollars in ransom to the Somali
pirates. 92 The pirates, in turn, have respected their promise not
to harm hostages if ransom is paid and have in most instances
93
released all hostages in good health.
Thus, the surge of piracy in Somalia seems to be driven by
poverty and fueled by the lack of a government and criminal law
enforcement mechanism. Moreover, until now, the lack of a
strong international response to fight Somali piracy has also
contributed to the proliferation of piracy acts in the Gulf of Aden
and the Indian Ocean. The tides may be turning on piracy, and
we may witness a more unified and potent battle to eradicate
Somali piracy, through a joint effort of naval powers. 94 However,
88. See Pitman, supra note 8 (recounting that Somalia "disintegrated in 1991 when
warlords toppled the president" and that since then, "it's been ruled by heavily armed
rival clans, hit by famine, and suffered relentless outbreaks of street-fighting that turned
it into a no-go zone for most foreigners").
89. See Mohamed Ahmed, Pirate Stock Exchange Helps Fund Hijackings, FINANcIAL
POST
(Can.),
Dec.
1,
2009,
http://www.financialpost.com/news-sectors/
story.html?id=2289558; Pitman, supra note 8 (noting that pirates operate openly in
several towns along the coast).
90. See Seychelles Coast GuardArrests 9 Suspected Pirates,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 28,
2009, at A2 (observing that the average person earns around US$600 per year in
Somalia).
91. See Kontorovich, supra note 7.
92. See Katharine Houreld, Somali Pirates Avoid Warships To Hijack 3 Ships,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/
20090406/piracy/ (describing the "multi-million dollar ransoms" that shipping
companies pay, which contribute to a "rare source of cash in Somalia.").
93. See Pitman, supra note 8 (indicating that pirates have rarely harmed hostages).
94. In the recent months, more nations have expressed their willingness to
apprehend pirates. On April 15, 2009, the French navy captured eleven pirates after they
launched an attack on the pirate ship that the French navy spotted with a surveillance
helicopter and observed over night. See Somali Pirates: We Will Hunt Americans, 'Slaughter
Them', CHIcAGO TRIB., Apr. 15, 2009, at A1O. Similarly, Yemen's coast guard rescued
thirteen Yemeni hostages in a shootout with the pirates on April 13, 2009. Id. The
German navy captured seven pirates on April 15, 2009, after pursuing the pirates by
warships in the Gulf of Aden. See Pirates Captured After Attacking German Tanker, CNN,
Apr.
15,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/03/31/
german.pirates.arrests.somalia/. Last, but not least, the United States navy successfully
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the fight against piracy on the whole will not be complete without
a full reexamination, and possible elaboration, of international
law, to define and sharpen the legal tools needed to capture and
prosecute both pirates themselves and the masterminds of piracy
operations. Without such reliance on international law, piracy
may surge in other areas of the world, where poverty and
unstable governments persist. Thus, Part III outlines the current
definition of piracy under international law, and the existing
jurisdictional basis to capture and prosecute pirates.
III. PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law currently defines piracy in several
conventions and provides for specific basis under which
countries may capture and prosecute pirates.
A.

Definition of Piracy Under InternationalLaw

The first successful modern-day attempt to codify the law of
piracy occurred in 1958, when eight articles addressing piracy
directly were adopted in Geneva and included in the Convention
on the High Seas ("Geneva Convention"). 95 These articles were
subsequently included in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 96 UNCLOS, while not
ratified by all countries, including the United States, nonetheless
represents "the best evidence of international law relating to the
97
maritime regime, and is therefore binding on all nations."
Under UNCLOS, an act must satisfy four criteria in order to
constitute piracy: it must (1) be committed on the high seas, (2)
be of a violent nature, (3) include at least two vessels, and (4) be

liberated a U.S. skipper, Richard Phillips, who surrendered himself to Somali pirates
after they attempted to hijack Phillips' ship, Maersk Alabama, and were warded off by the
ship's crew. See Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, Navy Rescues Captain, Killing 3 Pirate
Captors, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at Al. Finally, many nations have recently
pledged US$213 million to boost security in Somalia and halt piracy. See More Than
$200M Pledged To Beat Somali Pirates, CNN, Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
WORLD/africa/04/24/pirates.security.meeting.money/.
95. See Convention on the High Seas arts. 14-21, Apr. 29, 1958,13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
96. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100-07, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
97. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 90-91.
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committed for solely private aims. 98 This definition is widely
accepted as a reflection of customary law and recognized as the
most authoritative codification of piracy law, but significantly
narrows the definition of piracy. 99 First, any act, in order to
qualify as piracy, must be committed on the high seas. 10 0 This
means that acts committed in the territorial waters of any state
would not qualify as piracy, 10 1 even though they include the
violent seizure of a victim vessel by an aggressor vessel, for solely
private aims, such as monetary gain or hostage taking. Many of
the acts referred to as "piracy" routinely committed in the early
2000s in Southeast Asia in the territorial waters of Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, were stricto sensu not piracy under the
UNCLOS definition. 10 2 Similarly, acts committed by the Somali
pirates in the Somali territorial waters would not constitute
piracy, simply because they take place in the wrong geographic
zone.
Second, any act that fulfills the legal requirements of piracy
must involve separate vessels: a victim vessel and an aggressor
vessel. 10 3 If pirates board the victim vessel on shore and overtake
it during the victim vessel's voyage on the high seas, such an act
would not qualify as piracy because no aggressor vessel was
involved. 0 4 Thus if the Somali pirates were to board a foreign
ship docked in port by posing as crewmembers and then overtake
the ship on the high seas, this would not be piracy under
UNCLOS. For instance, when members of a Palestine Liberation
Organization ("PLO") faction overtook the Italian cruise ship
98. Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS") defines piracy as
(a) any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.
UNCLOS, supra note 96, art. 101. Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas
includes the same definition of piracy. See Geneva Convention, supra note 95, art. 15.
99. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 92.
100. See id. at 92-93.
101. See id.
102. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
103. See Dahlvang, supranote 72, at 27.
104. See id.
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Achille Lauro in 1985, the act did not constitute piracy under
UNCLOS because the aggressors had boarded the ship in its last
05
port; thus, no aggressor vessel.1
Third, if a piracy-like act is committed by a group with links
to a specific state, the state action character of the act would
defeat the wholly private aims requirement of UNCLOS because
of the alleged link between piracy and state action.1 0 6 Thus, in
the Achille Lauro incident, it was questionable whether the
hijacking qualified as piracy because the hijackers had specific
10 7
links to a state or a state-like entity, the PLO.
The international maritime community recognized the need
to expand the definition of piracy and drafted the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
Convention ("SUA Convention"). 10 8 The SUA Convention
drafters attempted to come up with a broader definition of illegal
violence at sea, which would capture acts such as the Achille Lauro
hijacking. 10 9 Under the SUA Convention, an act can qualify as
"piracy" even though it is not committed on the high seas." 0
Similarly, an act can qualify as "piracy" even though only one
vessel (the victim vessel) may be involved. 11' The SUA
112
Convention, however, does not use the term "piracy" at all,
and is even listed on the United Nations ("U.N.") website as an
antiterrorist convention. 113 Thus, it is questionable whether the
SUA Convention actually alters the definition of piracy.

105. For a description of the Achille Lauro incident, see id. at 27-28.
106. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 92 (arguing that the "private ends" restriction
has contributed to the most commonly adopted view that acts of violence committed for
religious, ethnic, or political reasons, such as acts of maritime terrorism, cannot be
treated as piracy).
107. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 26-27.
108. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOc. No. 101-1 (1990), 1678
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA Convention].
109. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 22.
110. SUA Convention, supra note 108, art. 4; see also Peppetti, supra note 17, at 94.
111. See SUA Convention, supra note 108, art. 3 (prohibiting any person from
"seiz[ing] or exercis[ing] control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other
form of intimidation").
112. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 23 (noting that the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("SUA") does
not refer to piracy by name).
113. See UN Action to Counter Terrorism: International Instruments to Counter
Terrorism, http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
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The SUA Convention, however, does solidify the link
between piracy and terrorism, by treating piracy as a form of
maritime terrorism and by equating the jurisdictional basis for
the capture and prosecution of pirates with those that already
exist in other antiterrorist conventions for the capture and
prosecution of terrorists. In fact, in response to recent acts of
terrorism, the maritime industry attempted to strengthen SUA
through amendments, known as the 2005 Protocols, which were
adopted on October 14, 2005, but have not yet entered into force
for lack of necessary state ratifications. 14 Thus, this Article argues
below that piracy-fighting countries need to rely more heavily on
conventions like SUA and other antiterrorism treaties, in order
tojustify their capture and prosecution of pirates, because pirates
should be fought like terrorists.
B. Jurisdictionto CapturePirates
Under international treaty law and under customary law, any
state has jurisdiction on the high seas to capture pirates. 115 Article
19 of the Geneva Convention and article 105 of UNCLOS
provide: "On the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or
aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board."1 16 In fact, under the law of the seas, the high seas are
viewed as no man's land and jurisdiction to apprehend belongs
1 7 However, no nation has the right to enter a
to all nations. H
state's territorial waters, within which only the state has exclusive
1
jurisdiction to apprehend. 1s
114. See IMO: Summary of Status of Conventions, http://www.imo.org/
conventions/mainframe.asp?topicjid=247 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); see also Jane
Andrewartha, English Maritime Law Update: 2005, 37 MAR. L. & COM. 359, 369 (2006).
115. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 22 (noting that every state may seize a pirate
ship and arrest the pirates on the high seas).
116. UNCLOS, supra note 96, art. 105; Geneva Convention, supra note 95, art. 19.
117. Hugo Grotius developed the concept of "mare liberum" in the early
seventeenth century and established the doctrine of freedom of the seas. Peppetti, supra
note 17, at 106.
118. UNCLOS limits the territorial waters of a state to twelve nautical miles off
shore. UNCLOS, supra note 96, art. 3. Note however that some nations, including China,
have taken a nonconformist approach and claim that their exclusive economic zones,
which typically extend out to two hundred nautical miles, constitute territorial waters.
See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 24. This approach significantly hinders the piracy fight
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The Somali pirates quickly took advantage of this situation
in 2007 when they would attack ships in the Gulf of Aden and
then quickly return to the Somali territorial waters, where they
were immune from capture by nations patrolling the Gulf of
Aden in an attempt to combat piracy. 119 In order to address this
unfortunate situation, the United Nations Security Council
passed five different resolutions in 2008, authorizing any nation
patrolling the Gulf of Aden to enter the Somali territorial waters
and to use force against pirates. 120 One of the five resolutions
even authorizes nations to enter the Somali territorial waters if in
"hot pursuit" of pirates. 121 Another, from December 16, 2008,
extends the authorization to use military force against Somali
122
pirates to land-based operations on the Somali mainland.
Under this resolution, nations can "undertake all necessary
measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of
'123
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea."
Because the above resolutions permit military action in
Somali territory beyond that already authorized by customary
law, many states with a history of piracy problems were
apprehensive about the scope of such resolutions and feared that
they would undermine national territorial sovereignty. 124 Thus,
the text accompanying the resolutions emphasized that they
applied solely to Somalia and that they would not establish any
new precedent under international law. 125 Moreover, all of the
under customary law, although the 2008 U.N. Security Council resolutions, see infra note
120, arguably trump customary law and allow any nation to fight piracy in Somali
territorial waters, whether such waters extend to twelve or two hundred nautical miles.
119. See Kontorovich, supra note 7.
120. See S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20,
2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
121. SeeS.C. Res. 1816, supra note 120, 1 7(a).
122. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 120, 6.
123. Id. The United States, the main proponent and drafter of Resolution 1851,
initially proposed language that would authorize operations in the Somali air space
when combating piracy, but this draft language was withdrawn when other nations
objected. The United States, however, maintains that Resolution 1851, as is, authorizes
operations in Somali air space. US Says Piracy Resolution Allows for Air Strikes in Somalia,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 17, 2008, available at 12/17/08 Agence Fr.-Presse 22:07:00
(Westlaw).
124. See Kontorovich, supranote 7.
125. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 120, 1 9 (affirming that the resolution
"applies only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or
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resolutions require consent from the Somali transitional
government before any of the patrolling nations attempts to
enter the Somali territorial waters. 126 Similarly, three of the five
resolutions require the patrolling nations to respect international
humanitarian law when chasing pirates and entering the Somali
territorial waters. 127 The latter restriction is problematic: under
international humanitarian law, pirates are considered civilians,
which significantly limits the nature and type of force that can be
128
used against them.
Under the SUA Convention, states have jurisdiction to
apprehend and capture pirates anywhere, not just on the high
seas. 129 Thus, the SUA Convention gives states more freedom in
their fight against piracy, like antiterrorist conventions do for any
state's fight against terrorism. However, under the SUA, a vessel
must nonetheless be in international transit, coming from a
130
foreign territory or the high seas, at the time of the illegal act.
Thus, a vessel navigating through purely territorial waters of a
state could not be apprehended under the SUA, and nations do
not have a right of entry into another nation's territorial waters
13
to capture pirates under this convention. '
As described in this section, international treaty and
customary law provides for narrow basis under which pirates can
be apprehended on the high seas or elsewhere. Recent U.N.
Security Council Resolutions have further expanded such basis
for the capture of Somali pirates, but unfortunately these
resolutions only apply to Somalia and will not be useful in
fighting piracy anywhere else in the world. Moreover, as will be
described in Part III.C, jurisdiction to capture pirates under

obligations or responsibilities of member states under international law ...with respect
to any other situation").
126. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 120, 3 (qualifying the ability to pursue
pirates into Somali waters with the "advance consent of the [Somali government]").
127. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 120, 6; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 120, 14;
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, 11. Moreover, Resolution 1838 only authorizes patrolling
nations to use "the necessary means, in conformity with international law." S.C. Res.
1838, supra note 120, 1 3.
128. See Kontorovich, supra note 7 (reasoning that pirates may only be specifically
targeted in immediate self-defense because they are treated like civilians under
international humanitarian law).
129. See SUA Convention, supra note 108, art. 4.
130. See id.

131. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 97.
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international law does not necessarily correspond to jurisdiction
to prosecute them, which may pose additional hurdles in the
global fight against piracy, and which may support this Article's
argument that piracy-fighting nations need to treat pirates as
terrorists and rely on antiterrorist laws.
C. Jurisdictionto ProsecutePirates
Piracy is the original universal jurisdiction crime. 132 Thus,
under traditional customary law, piracy is viewed as a heinous
crime against all nations and any state, acting as a global agent
on behalf of all nations, can choose to prosecute the offending
pirate.1 33 Treaty law and domestic laws, however, curtail the
134
customary law conception of piracy.
Article 19 of the Geneva Convention states that: "[t]he
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
13
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith."
Article 105 of UNCLOS repeats this principle, by specifically
authorizing the capturing nation to prosecute pirates. 136 Other
states, however, are not entitled to prosecute pirates under the
Geneva Convention or under UNCLOS. 137 This is problematic
for states, such as the United Kingdom, that transfer captured
pirates to so-called regional partner states, like Kenya, for
prosecution. 138 Under UNCLOS, the legality of this type of
transfer is dubious because only the capturing state holds
jurisdiction over captured pirates, and receiving states, like
1 39
Kenya, do not.
Under the SUA Convention, states again have more
freedom in terms of their jurisdiction to prosecute pirates. Under
this treaty, member states have an obligation to extradite or
132. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation,45 HARV.J. INT'L L. 183, 184 (2004).

133. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 106.
134. See id. at 107 (indicating domestic prosecution is often times not authorized
under the prosecuting state's national legal system).
135. Geneva Convention, supranote 95, art. 19.
136. UNCLOS, supranote 96, art. 105.
137. See Kontorovich, supra note 7.
138. See infra Part IV.C.
139. See Kontorovich, supra note 7.
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140
prosecute persons accused of behavior that qualifies as piracy.
While the SUA authorizes the capturing state to prosecute
pirates, it also condones transfers of pirates to third states, even
indicating that the third state "shall" accept such transferred
pirates. 141 The SUA Convention conceptualizes piracy similarly to
how antiterrorist conventions construe acts of terrorism, by
allowing virtually any state to prosecute captured pirates. 142 Thus,
states like the United Kingdom may rely on the SUA to justify the
14
transfer of captured pirates to regional partners like Kenya.
Despite states' international legal obligations stemming
from UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, domestic statutes do
not always allow for universal jurisdiction. The U.S. statute
implementing the SUA Convention, for instance, limits the U.S.
jurisdictional ability to prosecute pirates. 144 Under this statute,
the United States has jurisdiction to prosecute pirates only if such
pirates somehow acted against U.S. interests.145 Thus, the United
States may only prosecute pirates in the United States if captured
on the high seas and the pirates directed their activities against
U.S. ships or victims, or if the pirates are somehow later found on
U.S. soil.146

Piracy-fighting states should continue tojustify the legality of
their antipiracy measures, such as the prosecution of captured
pirates, by emphasizing the similarity between piracy and
terrorism and by relying on other antiterrorist conventions. This
Article outlines below the current possible responses to the
140. See SUA Convention, supra note 108, art. 10 ("[T] he state Party in the territory
of which the offender or the alleged offender is found shall, in cases to which article 6
applies, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without
delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings
in accordance with the law of that state."). Note, however, that scholars have argued that
the obligation to prosecute "only imposes the requirement to hold a preliminary
hearing, and not to actually prosecute the alleged offender before an independent court
of criminal justice." Peppetti, supranote 17, at 96.
141. See SUA Convention, supranote 108, art. 6(4).
142. See id. art. 6.
143. Reliance on the SUA Convention is problematic, however, since most nations
where pirate attacks typically occur, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Somalia, are not
members of this convention. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 23; Kontorovich, supra note
7.
144. See 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2006).
145. See id. § 2280(b) (limiting jurisdiction to a variety of situations involving the
United States).
146. See id.
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piracy threat, including the different prosecution options that
either already exist or have been advocated as solutions to this
emerging crime.
IV. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE CURRENT PIRACY THREAT
Several responses exist or have been suggested to fight
piracy. Specifically, these responses include different prosecution
options that exist over apprehended pirates, thereby avoiding the
situation where pirates are merely warded off or even released if
caught, as well as the existing international maritime
organizations that, thorough various efforts, aid the combat
against piracy.
A.

Domestic Prosecution

The most likely response to the piracy threat involves
prosecution of captured pirates in the domestic courts of the
capturing state. 147 Interestingly, this option has not been
exercised much in the most recent examples of captured Somali
pirates. 148 For example, when North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") forces rescued several fishermen from Somali pirates
in the Gulf of Aden in April 2009, they released the pirates
because they had no authority to arrest them. 149 When a Dutch
ship operating as part of a NATO fleet captured several pirates in
April 2009, the Dutch government announced quickly thereafter
that it would release the pirates because their seizure was
incorrect under Dutch law, as none of the pirates, victims, or the
victim vessel was Dutch. 150 Until this year, the United Kingdom
and the United States opted to transfer captured pirates to a
regional partner, such as Kenya, for prosecution rather than
15 1
prosecute them domestically.
147. One example of domestic prosecution of pirates is the Alondra Rainbow
incident described above in Part I. In that case, captured pirates were prosecuted in
India, the capturing nation, and received prison sentences of up to seven years. See, e.g.,
Peppetti, supra note 17, at 108-10 (describing the Alondra Rainbow incident and
subsequent pirate prosecution in India).
148. Todd Pitman & Katharine Houreld, NATO Frees 20 Hostages; Pirates Seize
Belgian Ship, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3 (noting that pirate prosecutions are
rare).

149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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The reasons why nations capturing pirates have been
reluctant to prosecute vary. First, many domestic laws only allow
for domestic criminal prosecution of pirates if they somehow
1 52
threatened the national interests of the prosecuting state.
Thus, the United States was unable to prosecute any Somali
pirates under its domestic law until April of 2009, when a U.S.
ship was attacked and its U.S. captain was held hostage. 53 Once
U.S. interests were threatened, the United States became an
available forum for the prosecution of Somali pirates. 154 Similarly
the French only chose to prosecute Somali pirates in France for
acts of piracy directed against a French luxury yacht. 155 French
law, similarly to U.S. law, allows for prosecution of pirates under
circumstances in which French national interests were
attacked. 156
Second, nations that capture pirates may opt against
prosecution because of the cost. In fact, paying ransom to pirates
for the release of the captive ship and crew may be a less
expensive option than attempting to capture pirates and to bring
them to the capturing nation for prosecution. 57 For example,
the United States recently captured a Somali pirate who was
involved in the attack on a U.S. ship in the Indian Ocean; the
pirate was brought to New York for prosecution under U.S.
law. 15 8 The pirate's prosecution and eventual detention, if he is
convicted, will cost the United States millions of dollars-an
amount much higher than a single ransom payment demanded
by the Somali pirates. 159 While prosecuting pirates in domestic
courts of the capturing state may be sensible for the purpose of

152. See supra Part III.C (using U.S. law as an example).
153. See supra notes 11, 94 and accompanying text (describing the April 2009
hijacking of the U.S. ship Maersk Alabama).
154. See Pitman & Houreld, supra note 148 (noting that the only captured hijacker
of U.S. captain Richard Phillips was brought to New York for trial in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York).
155. See France Raid Ship After Crew Feed, BBC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7342292.stm.
156. See id.
157. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
158. See Pitman & Houreld, supranote 148.
159. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
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deterrence, such prosecution is in fact a costlier option (and
more logistically difficult).160

Third, some capturing nations may have very little incentive
in seriously dealing with the piracy threat, 161 such as if they do
not have a highly developed shipping industry or other strategic
interests off the coast of Somalia. Finally, some capturing nations
may simply want to avoid the hassle associated with prosecuting
pirates, because of fear that piracy trials will be difficult, lengthy,
and burdensome on that nation's judiciary.1 62 Thus, some
capturing nations have advocated for options other than
domestic prosecutions in their own courts, such as the creation
of an ad hoc piracy tribunal and the transfer of pirates to
regional partners, like Kenya.
B.

Ad Hoc Tribunals

In the recent years, several ad hoc tribunals have been
created to deal with a variety of different criminal situations. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have been
established by the United Nations to prosecute individuals
responsible for heinous offenses committed during the civil wars
in those countries.1 63 The Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
Iraqi High Courts, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia are hybrid tribunals, created to bring
individual accountability for the most serious offenses committed
within those countries.1 64 Thus, some have suggested the creation
of an ad hoc piracy tribunal situated in a nation neighboring
160. See Kontorovich, supra note 7, (" [H] owever, in practice, the nations patrolling
the Gulf of Aden have chosen not to prosecute pirates because of the anticipated
difficulty and expense.").
161. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 111 (noting that states may lack the willingness
to prosecute pirates because of "the absence of a nexus to the crime" and because of a
"shortage of the necessary security and law enforcement authorities.").
162. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
163. Peppetti, supra note 17, at 143-44 (describing the existence of regional
tribunals exercising universal jurisdiction, such as the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
164. See, e.g., Peppetti, supra note 17, at 148 (describing the establishment and
structure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone); Michael P. Scharf, The Iraqi High
Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in InternationalJustice?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 258 (2007);
G6ran Sluiter, Due Process and CriminalProcedurein the Cambodian ExtraordinaryChambers,
4J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 314 (2006).
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Somalia to prosecute all captured pirates, avoiding the hassle of
domestic prosecution and situations where pirates are released
165
for lack of better options.
While this option seems theoretically attractive, it is doubtful
whether it has enough support with key players, such as the
United Kingdom or the United States, which have clearly
indicated that they prefer to create regional partnerships and to
have pirates prosecuted in domestic courts of such regional
partners. 166 It is also uncertain whether an ad hoc piracy tribunal
will ever be created in light of the high expense associated
therewith, and the difficult logistics that always accompany the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal. 167 An ad hoc piracy tribunal would
need to find appropriate housing for its trial and detention
facility; an acceptance from at least one host country; a trained
judiciary, prosecution, and defense counsel; and to develop a
uniform piracy law that would be applied to all captured
pirates.168 The difficulty of these tasks may outweigh the benefits
of an ad hoc piracy tribunal, in light of the fact that some
nations, like Kenya, may prove willing to prosecute pirates
domestically.
C.

Regional Partnerships

In 2008, the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with Kenya, whereby any captured pirates would
be transferred to Kenya for prosecution in their civil courts
under and under its criminal law. 169 Similarly, in 2009 the United
States concluded a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding
with Kenya, whereby any pirates captured by the United States
165. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75; see also Peppetti, supra note 17, at 148 (calling
for the establishment of specialized regional tribunals vested with universal jurisdiction
and thus the power to prosecute pirates).
166. As described below, the United Kingdom has already signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with Kenya, whereby captured pirates would be transferred to Kenya
for prosecution in the Kenyan domestic courts. See infra Part IV.C. The United States has
also experimented with this idea by transferring captured pirates to Kenya in 2006, in a
controlled test case. See infra, note 171. When the United States captured one of the
Somali hijackers who had held U.S. captain Richard Phillips, in April 2009, there was
some speculation as to whether the captured pirate would be tried in Kenya or brought
to the United States for prosecution. See Kennedy, supra note 94.
167. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
168. Id.
169. See Kontorovich, supranote 7.
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could be transferred to Kenya for prosecution. 170 To date, only
one such prosecution of Somali pirates took place in Kenya,
when the United States captured a group of pirates in 2006 and
transferred them to Kenyan courts, where the pirates received
seven-year prison sentences. 171 Piracy-fighting countries like the
United Kingdom and the United States may hope to solidify the
transfer mechanism and to potentially develop other regional
partnerships; however, the legality of such transfers is dubious
under international law.
First, UNCLOS gives the capturing nation jurisdiction to
prosecute pirates, but it does not vest such powers on third
states. 172 In fact, article 105 of UNCLOS provides that "every
State may seize a pirate ship" on the high seas, but that the
prosecution should take place in "the courts of the state which
carried out the seizure."1 73 The drafting history of UNCLOS
confirms that this article was intended to preclude transfers to
third states. 174 Thus, the authority of a state to take military action
against the Somali pirates in light of the recent U.N. Security
Council resolutions may not translate into a corresponding
authority to prosecute. While it is true that the SUA Convention
allows for the transfer of pirates to third-party states for criminal
prosecution, Somalia and many other countries are not members
175
of the SUA Convention and its utility may prove limited.
Second, the capturing nation may be bound by various
human rights conventions, like the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights 176 or the European Convention on

170. See Gerry J. Gilmore, Kenyan Government Agrees to Try Pirates Seized by U.S.
Forces, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=52871.
171. See Peppetti, supra note 17, at 110. In this case, ten Somali pirates attacked an
Indian ship, the Safina Al Bisaarat.See id. Five days later, a U.S. ship captured the pirates,
which, incidentally, marked the first capture of pirates by U.S. naval forces in
generations. See id. at 89-90. Eight days after the pirates were captured, the United
States experimented with the United Kingdom-Kenya form of partnership by
transferring a group of captured pirates to Kenya for prosecution in 2006. See
Kontorovich, supra note 7.
172. SeeKontorovich, supra note 7.
173. UNCLOS, supra note 108, art. 105.
174. See Kontorovich, supranote 7; ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
175. See Kontorovich, supra note 7.
176. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Human Rights. 77 These nations also have a nonrefoulement
obligation and may not transfer pirates to third states if there is a
risk that pirates will be tortured in such third states or that they
178
would not receive a fair trial.
Third, the law of the receiving state may complicate matters.
In Kenya, for example, some scholars have interpreted domestic
law to require that any arrested person be brought before a
magistrate within twenty-four hours of his or her arrest. 179 In the
case of pirates captured on the high seas, far off the Kenyan
coast, this requirement may be difficult to satisfy, simply because
the transfer of such pirates to Kenya may take several days. 180 Also
in Kenya, evidence law does not provide for the introduction of
witness statements into evidence, calling instead for the
production of witnesses themselves at trial. 8 1 This requirement
may also be difficult to satisfy, as witnesses to the pirate attack
may live or be stationed far from Kenya and may not be available
to assist with the Kenyan trial. 182 Other pirate states receiving
pirates may not have adequate laws or procedures for handling
piracy trials. 183 Thus, while regional partnerships represent an
attractive option for the capturing state, these partnerships
should be developed only after careful scrutiny of the receiving
state's criminal system and actual ability to handle piracy trials.
D.

Maritime Organizations

The presence of international maritime organizations may
aid the fight against piracy by supplementing the prosecution
options described above. The two main international maritime
bodies involved in antipiracy efforts include the International
177. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
178. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
179. ASIL Meeting, supranote 75.
180. Id.
181. See An Act of Parliament to Declare the Law of Evidence, (2005) Cap. 80 § 146
(Kenya).
182. See id. §§ 33-34.
183. For example, the Alondra Rainbow prosecution, see supra Part I, was almost
undermined because the Indian Penal code had no adequate provisions against piracy.
Peppetti, supra note 17, at 111.
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Maritime Organization ("IMO") and the International Maritime
Bureau ("IMB") .184
The IMO is described as "a specialized UN agency which is
responsible for measures to improve the safety of international
shipping and to prevent marine pollution from ships." 18 5 It is
currently composed of about 169 states, 75 intergovernmental
organizations, and 58 nongovernmental organizations. 8 6 The
IMO administers several international agreements, some of
which are aimed at combating piracy.18 7 The organization also
contributes to the fight against piracy by requiring ships to have
specific IMO numbers visibly displayed on their hulls, which in
turn prevents the use and resale of phantom ships (ships that are
hijacked, and then later repainted and reused by pirates or
terrorists).188 Moreover, the IMO has helped to raise security
requirement for ships in ports, by enacting new, stricter
regulations for port safety. 18 9 Finally, the IMO manages routing
schemes for international shipping; these schemes can help to
prevent piracy by rerouting smaller vessels from pirate-infested
waters or by providing security to all ships sailing through such
dangerous waters. 190
The IMB, on the other hand, is a branch of the
International Chamber of Commerce and established a Piracy
Reporting Centre in Malaysia in 1992.191 The centre collects
piracy reports and broadcasts them to ships at sea; coast guards
184. See generally International Maritime Organization [IMO], http://www.imo.org
(last visited Feb. 28, 2010); ICC, International Maritime Bureau, http://www.icc-ccs.org/
index.php?option=comcontent&id=27&itemid=16 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
185. See Dahlvang, supranote 72, at 34.
States,
http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?
Member
186. IMO,
topic-id=315 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); IMO, NGOs and IGOs, http://www.imo.org/
About/mainframe.asp?topicid=1639 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/
IMO
Conventions,
187. See
IMO,
mainframe.asp?topic-id=148#5 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010). In fact, the International
Maritime Organization ("IMO") administers the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea. See id.
188. SeeJohn Parker, Foiling the "Phantoms,"TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 17, 2001, at
34; Press Release, IMO, Electric Fence for Ships Steps up Fight Against Pirates (Jan. 23,
2003), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/icccbdd/index.html.
189. The IMO's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code entered into
force in July 2004. See EradicatingPiracy Together, MALAYSIAN BUS.,Jan. 16, 2004, at 45.
190. See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 212-14 (2d ed. 1988);
Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 36.
http://www.icc-ccs.org/
Reporting
Centre,
ICC,
IMB
Piracy
191. See
index.php?option=comcontent&id=30&itemid=12 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
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thus learn about piracy incidents quickly.1 92 Moreover, the centre
is involved in locating hijacked ships and has made significant
193
achievement in such efforts.
The above two international maritime organizations
contribute to the fight against piracy through spreading valuable
information. "IMB statistics are the primary source of
information regarding maritime piracy, and analysis of these
reports has resulted in specific recommendations for preventing
pirate attacks.... The collection and distribution of information
about such piracy movements and efforts remains crucial in
194
continuing the fight against piracy."
All of the above mechanisms for combating piracy, however,
may not be enough. This Article advocates the need for more
aggressive measures in fighting Somali piracy; such aggressive
measures may then be transplanted to any other region of the
world where piracy may develop and thrive next. In particular,
this Article argues that pirates should be equated with terrorists
and fought under the same antiterrorist measures, laws,
regulations, and conventions.
V. THE NEED FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE MEASURES IN
FIGHTING SOMALI PIRACY
Pirates can be successfully fought in Somalia if two
conditions are met. First, pirates should be captured and
prosecuted routinely and treated like terrorists. Antiterrorist laws
should help piracy-fighting countries to overcome legal hurdles
currently posed by existing international law on piracy. Second,
piracy in Somalia will thrive as long as lawlessness prevails in this
war-torn region. Thus, the true solution to fighting piracy in
Somalia will require rebuilding a stable society in Somalia.
A.

Piracy as Terrorism

Pirates could be more effectively prosecuted if they were
treated as terrorists. In fact, if pirates were treated as terrorist, a
variety of antiterrorist conventions could become available as a

192. See Dahivang, supranote 72, at 37-38.
193. See id. at 37.

194. Id.
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basis for their criminal prosecution, such as SUA, 195 the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircrafts, 196 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 197 the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 198 the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,'" the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, 20 0 the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf,20 1 and the International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. 20 2 These antiterrorist
conventions could either be relied upon directly, should the
piracy act fit within the precise framework of one of these
conventions, or simply as jurisdictional and procedural models
for handling piracy captures and trials. Piracy, as this Article
argues, constitutes terrorism on the high seas, and pirates should
be treated as terrorists.
While it seems unlikely at the present time that the proceeds
of Somali piracy fund any particular terrorist activity,203 the link
between piracy and terrorism in general is real. For example,
195. SUA Convention, supra note 108.
196. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircrafts, Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
197. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
198. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
199. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
200. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-19 (1988), 1589 U.N.T.S. 474.
201. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-1
(1990), 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
202. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15,
1997, S. TREATYDOC. No. 106-6 (1999), 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
203. While there are no conclusive reports that Somali piracy is fueling terrorism,
U.S. officials believe that A-Qaeda has operatives in Somalia. See Pitman, supra note 8.
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pirate ships routinely seize weapons from victim vessels, and may
be involved in the resale and smuggling of such weapons to
terrorist groups. 204 For example, in 2002, the Israeli Navy seized a
vessel carrying a significant amount of weapons intended for the
Palestinian Authority. 2 5 A series of similar incidents allegedly
involved A1-Qaeda, and some reports indicate that Osama bin
20 6
Laden himself has access to at least twenty sea vessels.
Moreover, explosives used to attack the U.S. embassies in Africa
in 1998 and the nightclubs in Bali in 2002 were all apparently
smuggled in on such ships. 20 7 It is very difficult to fight pirates
smuggling weapons on a state level because their ships routinely
fly so-called flags-of-convenience, 2 8 their ships may be registered
through another state's shipping company, 20 9 and the pirates
210
themselves may come from a variety of different countries.
Thus, weapon smuggling pirates should be fought on an
international level, exactly like terrorists, and should be
prosecuted on the basis of antiterrorist international
conventions.
Moreover, piracy in general has served to fund terrorist
groups. 211 While there is not a known direct link between piracy
and terrorism funding in Somalia as of now, such a link has
certainly existed in the recent past. In August 2003, an oil tanker
sailing through the Straits of Malacca was hijacked by pirates,
who demanded a significant ransom in return for the release of
hostages.2 12 The IMB strongly believed that this attack was linked
to Indonesia Aceh rebels who were motivated to fund their rebel
movement. 213 In the Philippines, a terrorist group known as Abu
204. See Pitman, supra note 8.
205. See Philip Cornford & Sarah Crichton, The Ships That Died of Shame, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD,Jan. 14, 2003, at 13; Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 31.
206. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 32.
207. See id.
208. The flags-of-convenience issue is especially problematic because states on the
flags have no control over the vessels, and some states have little incentive to contribute
to any antiterrorism or antipiracy efforts because they are actually land-locked. See id. at
31.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 32.
212. See Delphine Soulas, Poverty Stirs Turbulence in Asian Waters; Attacks on Ships
Triple Since '93, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al7.
213. See New Brand of Piracy Threatens Oil Tankers in Malacca Straits, ICC, Sep. 2,
2003, http://www.icc.wbo.org/iccdfid/index.html.
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Sayyaf regularly kidnapped foreigners at sea and demanded
multimillion dollar ransoms.2 14 At other times, pirates have gone
after ships carrying valuable cargo, which suggests that pirates
may be paying off port and government officials who supply them
with ship manifests, that detail the ships' cargo, and then
215
suppress investigations into the captured ships and cargo.
Thus, pirates are able to sell the ships and cargo seized for
handsome profit, which in turn may fund specific terrorist
activities or groups.
On a purely theoretical level, pirates and terrorists differ in
one aspect: the latter seem to function on the basis of a particular
political or religious ideology, while the former, at least in
Somalia, seem driven by purely financial gains. Pirates and
terrorists however proffer many similarities. First, both piracy and
terrorism are a form of organized crime, with powerful
masterminds and entire rings of executioners. 2 16 In terms of
fighting piracy and terrorism, going after the executioners may
not do enough and instead, one may have to focus on the
masterminds. Thus, when going after the Somali pirates,
countries like the United Kingdom and the United States need to
be able to go after the masterminds-the Somali warlords hiding
behind the lawlessness of mainland Somalia. Customary
international law does not provide capturing nations with the
authority to enter Somalia's territory to arrest piracy
masterminds, and while some of the 2008 U.N. Security Council
resolutions go as far as to authorize capturing nations to enter
Somali territorial waters and the Somali land,2 17 this option has
not been exercised yet by any piracy fighting nation. 218 Some
antiterrorist conventions, however, would authorize capturing

214. Abbu Sayyaf is an Islamist separatist movement linked to A1-Qaeda, as well as

another organization responsible for the 2002 Bali attacks. See David E. Kaplan et al., The
Shadow over the Summit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 2003, at 29.
215. See Dahlvang, supra note 72, at 32.
216. See Donald J. Puchala, Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History
Teach, 26 CONTEMP. SECURITYPOL'Y 1, 19 (2005).

217. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supranote 120, 2.
218. It will be interesting to observe whether the United States chooses to go after
piracy masterminds and enter the Somali land in the wake of the hijacking of the U.S.
ship, Maersk Alabama, and its captain, Richard Phillips, in April 2009. In fact, Vice
Admiral William Gortney recently stated that "[t]he ultimate solution for piracy is on
land." Pentagon Looks to Move Battle Against Pirates Ashore, CNN, Apr. 14, 2009,

http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/14/obama.pirates/.
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nations to enter Somalia in pursuit of the operation
masterminds, improving the limited legal tools that are available
to nations fighting piracy. 219 Second, both piracy and terrorism
exist on a supranational level; their executioners function
privately, beyond the sponsorship of any particular state, and
their targets come from a variety of different states. 220 The Somali
pirates have gone after ships of many different nationalities so
far, and the taken hostages have come from a myriad of different
countries. 221 Terrorists, likewise, have operated against many
different nations and have harmed nationals of many different
states. 222 In fighting pirates, similarly to fighting terrorists,
nations may have to come together to form coalitions, and to rely
on international law for tools that will provide them jurisdiction
to go after and try captured pirates. Third, both terrorists and
pirates seem to thrive in lawless regions-recenly, terrorists have
found safe haven in the remote mountains of Afghanistan and
224
Pakistan, 223 and pirates have flourished in war-torn Somalia.
When dealing with the piracy problem, countries may need to
rely on international law to find authority to conduct air or landbased military initiatives against pirates/terrorists.
Because the fight against pirates parallels the fight against
terrorists, countries need to be able to treat pirates exactly as

219. Some of the more recent antiterrorist conventions that could be used in the
fight against piracy, either as models or as treaties to be directly relied upon, include the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircrafts, supra note 196, the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
supra note 197, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 198, the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 199, the Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 200, the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,
supra note 201, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, supra note 202.
220. See Douglas R. Burgess Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug.
2005, at 32, 32-33.
221. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 7 (remarking that "pirates make no
discrimination among vessels" and that "[a] nything is fair game").
222. See Adam Roberts, The Changing Faces of Terrorism, BBC, Aug. 27, 2002,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/septl 1/changing_faces_01.shtml.
223. See Alan Cowell, Britain to Add 700 Troops to Fight in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2009, at Al2.
224. See PentagonLooks to Move Battle Against PiratesAshore, supra note 218.
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terrorists, in order to widen their range of available legal, military
and political strategies. One of such strategies involves relying on
antiterrorist conventions, like SUA, to find justification for the
apprehension of pirates on Somali land or for the prosecution of
pirates in Kenya or other regional partners.
B.

Rebuilding Somalia and Its Institutions

Finally, piracy will thrive in Somalia as long as lawlessness
and poverty prevail in this war-torn country. 225 Piracy exists in
Somalia because many people are poor and cannot find
adequate employment to support their families. 22 6 Piracy also
exists in Somalia because there is no central government that
could fight pirates: the country has had no government, no
organized army or police force, and no functioning judiciary for
almost two decades.2 27 In such a cowboy climate, pirates are able
to freely dock their ships in Somali ports and escort their
hostages onto Somali land without any fear of arrest or other
repercussions by the Somali government. 228 Thus, fighting piracy
229
off the coast of Somalia may also require rebuilding Somalia.
Countries that have felt threatened by piracy may need to lobby
the U.N. for funds and support in rebuilding the political
institutions and infrastructure of Somalia, and may need to invest
their own time and effort in recreating a stable and peaceful

225. Vice Admiral William Gortney, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command and the Combined Maritime Forces, recently stated that "[p]iracy around
the world stems from activity where there is lawlessness, lack of governance, economic
instability; things of that nature. And wherever you have that, you're going to have
criminal activity at sea." Id.
226. See Somalia: Addressing the Root Causes of Piracy and Warlordism, INT'L LABOUR
ORG.,
Oct.
13,
2009,
http://www.ilo.org/global/About -the ILO/
Media and-public information/Featurestories/lang-en/WCMS_ 15375/index.htm.
227. See Pitman, supra note 8.
228. See id.
229. Many analysts have already argued that piracy cannot be fought off the coast
of Somalia by security alone, and the deputy commander of the U.S. Africa Command in
Germany has recently stated that the only long-term solution would be to resolve the
political instability in Somalia. See Seychelles Coast Guard Arrests 9 Suspected Pirates, supra
note 90. Similarly, Mary Yates, a senior U.S. diplomat serving as African deputy for civilmilitary activities, recently stated that "[wie have to get at the root causes, and the root
causes are on the land." Id.
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23 0
Somali society. Otherwise, pirates will continue to thrive.
Already, piracy is developing off the coast of Nigeria, another
relatively unstable country. 231 Piracy may similarly spread to other
unstable regions, and we may face a return of the seventeenth
232
century paradigm: wherever there is water, pirates thrive.
Ensuring peace and stability in Somalia, and possibly in other
regions, may be the most significant and comprehensive step in
fighting piracy.

C.

CautionaryNote: Is the Fight Against Piracy Purely Theoretical?

Despite the possible responses to the piracy threat in
Somalia and elsewhere, as outlined above, the scope of this
Article may admittedly have more academic than practical value.
The Author firmly believe that pirates are dangerous and that
world powers like the United States should use more aggressive
means in combating sea terrorists. Thus, this Article presents
what is the most ideal response to the piracy threat. However, in
reality, this view may have little practical appeal for countries
facing the piracy issue, for a variety of pragmatic, geopolitical,
financial, and strategic reasons.
First, fighting pirates on a serious military level, as advocated
above, is incredibly costly. The United Kingdom, the United
States, or any other maritime force attempting to aggressively
wage a war on piracy in Somalia or elsewhere would have to
increase its naval presence in the affected zone. To that end,
piracy fighting countries would have to deploy more ships in
piracy-infested seas, equip such ships with appropriate weapons
and pirate tracking devices, and risk marine and soldier lives by
instructing them to engage in combat against the pirates. Such
efforts carry an enormous price tag, 233 especially as compared to
234
the low effort and cost attached to the paying of ransoms.
Thus, from a financial standpoint, fighting pirates may not be
attractive, and countries may just continue to pay multi-million
230. See Pitman, supra note 8 (arguing that because the developed countries,
including the United States, have not undertaken significant efforts to help Somalia
rebuild itself, now its "anarchy... has come back to haunt.").
231. See, e.g., Nigeria: Piracy Report Says Nigerian Waters the Most Deadly, IRIN NEWS
(Nairobi, Kenya),July 27, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=50843.
232. See Burgess, supra note 20, at 307.
233. ASIL Meeting, supra note 75.
234. Pentagon Looks to Move Battle Against PiratesAshore, supra note 218.
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dollar ransoms, as long as pirates keep releasing hostages without
any violence.
Second, piracy always thrives in lawless regions, like Somalia.
As advocated above, eradicating piracy may entail the rebuilding
of stable societies and the reestablishment of order, so that
pirates no longer enjoy the immunity of chaotic, unstable,
government-less areas. 23 5 World powers like the United States
simply may not be willing or able to help every troubled zone in
the world. The United States has contributed a significant
number of soldiers to internationally-organized humanitarian
missions over the last two decades;3 6 thus, it may simply not have
enough manpower or political willingness to engage in every
single lawless region. The true piracy eradicating solution (the
rebuilding of stable societies) may not be a feasible goal.
Finally, from a purely opportunistic standpoint, countries
like the United States or the United Kingdom may not have
enough strategic incentive to go after pirates, as long as U.S. or
British ships are not often attacked, and as long as U.S. or British
interests are not more directly threatened. For example, were it
firmly proven that pirates harbored dangerous terrorists or
directly aided groups like Al-Qaeda, the United States and the
United Kindgom would surely rethink their strategy and their
efforts against pirates. Until such times, naval powers may
continue to employ meager efforts in the fight against piracy,
and, consequently, piracy may continue to thrive uninterrupted
and unhindered.
Because of the dangers associated with piracy, the Author
will continue to advocate their view in academic forums, in
perhaps vain hopes of catching a political eye and attracting
more concrete support. As stated earlier in this Article, pirates
27
are sea terrorists and should be fought with full force.
CONCLUSION
Modern-day piracy, currently thriving in Somalia and
possibly spreading to other regions of the world, is a serious
235. Id.
236. See NINA M. SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED
STABILITY OPERATIONS: ISSUES OF U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT 4-5 (2006), available at

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64961.pdf
237. See discussion supra Part V.A.

408

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:372

threat to all naval nations, their ships and crewmembers, as well
as their cargo. 238 Pirates today operate like terrorists-they go
after any prey that they estimate easy to capture, irrespective of
the nationality of the ship or its crew members. 239 Thus, they
function in a supranational sphere, as a global threat to all
nations and a lingering menace on all seas. Moreover, a serious
danger looms that pirates may become linked to other terrorist
groups. 240 All countries, and especially those with a significant
naval presence, should undertake serious efforts to fight piracy in
Somalia and ensure that it does not reemerge in other lawless
regions. Pirates need to be fought in a serious manner: with
routine capture, prosecution, and punishment in the courts of
piracy-fighting states. In order to accomplish these goals, piracyfighting countries should rely on antiterrorist conventions as a
legal basis for the battle against piracy and continue to cooperate
in the struggle against the Somali, and other, pirates. Finally,
piracy-fighting countries may need to undertake additional
efforts to rebuild Somalia and to ensure that such lawlessness
does not occur in other regions of the world. In fact, piracy, like
terrorism, thrives in disordered states, war-torn regions, and
impoverished areas.2 4 1 Thus, the best long-term solution against
piracy may be the developed world's commitment to
reestablishing functioning order in developing and failed states,
like Somalia.
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